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Preface 
This report investigates ‘The effect of increasing the number of wind turbine generators on 
wholesale spot prices in the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) from 2014 to 2025’.  
The report is part of research project titled: An investigation of the impacts of increased 
power supply to the national grid by wind generators on the Australian electricity industry: 
ARC Linkage Project (LP110200957, 2011-2014). 
The aim of the project is to discover the most economical and effective way to 
accommodate large increases in wind power into the national grid and to understand the 
effects on the national electricity market. This is crucial to ensure stability of electricity 
supply and affordable prices in the transition towards a low carbon economy. 
Significant increases in Australian power generation using wind are planned for the coming 
years. This project answers urgent questions concerning the capability of the existing power 
grid to cope with a volatile source of supply, required grid modifications, impacts on the 
national electricity market (NEM), the optimal placement of wind farms and the Large-scale 
Renewable Energy Target (LRET). This is, necessarily, an interdisciplinary project involving 
economists, electrical engineers and climate scientists with very strong support from the 
wind generators. A coherent government policy to phase in renewable energy in a cost 
effective manner will not be possible without high quality research of this kind. 
The project’s electricity market modelling tool is the Australian National Electricity Market 
(ANEM) model version 1.10 (Wild et al. 2015).  Wild et al. (2015) provides extensive details 
of the version of the ANEM model used in this project.  Table 1 provides a list of the project’s 
publications. 
Table 1: The project’s publications 
Journal publications: 
Bell, WP, Wild, P, Foster, J, and Hewson, M (2015), Wind speed and electricity demand 
correlation analysis in the Australian National Electricity Market: Determining wind 
turbine generators’ ability to meet electricity demand without energy storage, 
Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. In Press, doi:10.1016/j.eap.2015.11.009 
Wild, P, Bell, WP and Foster, J, (2015) Impact of Carbon Prices on Wholesale Electricity 
Prices and Carbon Pass-Through Rates in the Australian National Electricity Market. 
The Energy Journal, 36 3: doi:10.5547/01956574.36.3.pwil 
Final reports: 
Wild, P, Bell, WP, Foster, J, and Hewson, M (2015), Australian National Electricity Market 
Model version 1.10, EEMG Working Paper 2-2015, The University of Queensland, 
Brisbane, Australia. 
Bell, WP, Wild, P, Foster, J, and Hewson, M (2015), The effect of increasing the number of 
wind turbine generators on transmission line congestion in the Australian National 
Electricity Market from 2014 to 2025, EEMG Working Paper 3-2015, The University of 
Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. 
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Abstract 
This report investigates the effect of increasing the number of wind turbine generators on 
wholesale spot prices in the Australian National Electricity Market’s (NEM) existing 
transmission grid from 2014 to 2025.  This reports answers urgent questions concerning the 
capability of the existing transmission grid to cope with significant increases in wind power.  
The report findings will help develop a coherent government policy to phase in renewable 
energy in a cost effective manner. 
We use a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the effect of five different levels of wind penetration 
on wholesale spot prices. The five levels of wind penetration span Scenarios A to E where 
Scenario A represents ‘no wind’ and Scenario E includes all the existing and planned wind 
power sufficient to meet Australia’s 2020 41TWh Large Renewable Energy Target (LRET).  
We also use sensitivity analysis to evaluate the effect on wholesale spot prices of growth in 
electricity demand over the projections years 2014 to 2015 and weather over the years 2010 
to 2012.  The sensitivity analysis uses simulations from the ‘Australian National Electricity 
Market (ANEM) model version 1.10’ (Wild et al. 2015). 
We find divergence in the prices between states and similar prices for nodes within states.  
This pattern reflects the findings in our transmission congestion report (Bell et al. 2015a).  
Only 14 of the 68 transmission lines in the ANEM Model (Wild et al. 2015) are congested but 
these 14 congested transmission lines include six of the NEM’s interstate interconnectors 
and eight of the intrastate transmission lines although only three of the intrastate 
transmission lines exhibited any significant degree of congestion.  This supports Garnaut’s 
(2011, p. 38) assessment on gold plating intrastate transmission and under investing in 
interstate transmission. 
We find increasing wind power penetration decreases wholesale spot prices but retail prices 
fail to reflect the decrease in wholesale spot prices.  Victoria is the only state in NEM with a 
deregulated retail sector and the retail sector has increased profits rather than through the 
savings to retail customer.  The other states are regulated and unable pass through the 
savings.  There is a requirement for simply better regulation or increased competition by 
breaking up the large generator-retails companies into separate retail and generator 
companies. 
Wind power has the potential to further reduce wholesale prices across the whole of the 
NEM but the congestion in the interconnectors limits this potential.  There is a requirement 
for a high capacity transmission backbone that can link the NEM’s peripheral states via 
Victoria and NSW (Bell et al. 2015d).  This requirement will become more pressing as 
Australia moves beyond its current 20% LRET.  However both the regulatory and 
institutional arrangements require some adjustment before such a project becomes feasible 
and for the NEM to avail itself of the full benefit of wind power to reduce both wholesale spot 
prices and carbon emissions. 
In further research, we (Bell et al. 2015b, 2015c) investigate augmenting the NEM’s 
transmission grid to reduce wholesale spot prices across the NEM and address the price 
differential between states under increasing wind power penetration. 
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1 Introduction 
This report’s primary aim is to investigate ‘The effect of increasing the number of wind 
turbine generators on wholesale spot prices in the Australian National Electricity Market from 
2014 to 2025’.  The report is part of the research project titled ‘An investigation of the 
impacts of increased power supply to the national grid by wind generators on the Australian 
electricity industry’. The sensitivity analysis in this report uses simulations from the 
‘Australian National Electricity Market (ANEM) model version 1.10’ (Wild et al. 2015) to 
model the effect of five different levels of wind penetration on wholesale spot prices.  The 
five levels of wind penetration span Scenarios A to E where Scenario A represents ‘no wind’ 
and Scenario E includes all the existing and planned wind power sufficient to meet 
Australia’s 2020 41TWh Large Renewable Energy Target.  Wild et al. (2015) provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the both the ANEM model and the five levels of wind power 
penetration.   
Bell et al. (2015d) analyses wind speed and electricity demand correlation to determine the 
ability of wind turbine generators to meet electricity demand in the Australian National 
Electricity Market (NEM) without the aid of energy storage.  They find the most advantage 
from the lack of correlation between wind speed between the NEM’s peripheral states 
including QLD, SA and TAS.  Additionally, the correlation between electricity demand and 
wind speed is strongest between these states.  Similarly, they find the most advantage from 
the lack of correlation between electricity demands in each of these states.  However, the 
NEM requires sufficient transmission capacity through VIC and NSW to maximise the benefit 
of wind power in the peripheral states and the NEM generally.  To that end, this report 
examines price islanding effects that reflect potential transmission constraints through VIC 
and NSW as well as between other States.   
Section 2 discusses the methodology for the sensitivity analysis and provides an extremely 
brief outline of the ANEM model (Wild et al. 2015).  Section 3 presents the results of the 
sensitivity analysis.  Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes the report. 
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2 Methodology: a sensitivity analysis using five levels of wind 
penetration 
Wild et al. (2015) provides a detailed description of the ANEM model, justification for the five 
levels of wind penetration and the incrementing of the baseline electricity demand profile 
years 2010 to 2012 to form three demand projections from 2014 to 2025.  This section 
provides a brief outline of the ANEM model, the five levels of wind penetration and the 
demand profiles before presenting the sensitivity analysis results in the next section. 
2.1 Australian National Electricity Market Model 
The following description provides a simplified computer input-output overview of the ANEM 
model. 
The inputs of the ANEM model are: 
 half hourly electricity “total demand” for 50 nodes in the NEM; 
 parameter and constraint values for 68 transmission lines and 330 generators, 
albeit incorporating the de-commissioning of generation plant occurring over the 
period 2007-2014; 
 carbon price, which is assumed zero in this project; 
 fossil fuel prices; and 
 network topology of nodes, transmission lines and generators. 
The outputs of the ANEM model are: 
 wholesale spot price at each node (half hourly), 
 energy generated by each generator (half hourly), 
 energy dispatched (sent out) by each generator (half hourly), 
 power flow on each transmission line (half hourly), and 
 carbon dioxide emissions for each generator (daily). 
2.2 Five levels of wind penetration  
We group existing and planned windfarms into five levels of wind penetration. 
a. No wind generation 
b. Operational and under construction 
c. Advanced planning (+all the windfarms above) 
d. Less advanced planning  (+all the windfarms above) 
e. Least advanced planning (+all the windfarms above) 
Details of the windfarms within the five groups are in the project report ‘ANEM model version 
1.10’  (Wild et al. 2015, tbls. 4 & 5). 
2.3 Baseline years 2010-12 and projections years 2014-25 
The project uses electricity demand profiles from three calendar years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  
Using the demand profiles from these three calendar years reduces the chances of 
modelling an unrepresentative weather year.  Additionally, these weather years provide half-
hourly correspondence between electricity demand for each node on the NEM and wind 
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power generated for the five levels of wind penetration for each node on the NEM. The wind 
power generated is calculated from half-hourly wind climatology results for the years 2010 to 
2012 (Wild et al. 2015).  
The demand profiles in the three baseline-years are incremented to form projections for the 
years 2014 to 2025, making three projections.  We simulated the five levels of wind 
penetration for each projection base year, making fifteen projections in all to allow sensitivity 
analysis.  
Examining the three baseline years 2010 to 2012 considers the effect of differing annual 
weather systems on the dynamics of the NEM and the wholesale spot prices.  In contrast, 
the projections years 2014 to 2025 consider the effect of growth in electricity demand on the 
dynamics of the NEM and the wholesale spot prices.  
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3 Results 
This section presents the results, which should be read while viewing the diagrams in the 
project report ‘Australian National Electricity Market model version 1.10’ (Wild et al. 2015, 
figs. 1-6).  These diagrams relate the node numbers to the topology of the transmission 
network.  Additionally, Wild et al. (2015, tbl. 5) relates the windfarms to their nodes on the 
NEM.  
The project’s transmission congestion report (Bell et al. 2015a, tbl. 2) finds congestion on 
only 14 of the 68 transmission lines in the ANEM Model (Wild et al. 2015).  Notably, these 14 
congested transmission lines include all the NEM’s six interstate interconnectors and eight 
intrastate transmission lines but only three of the intrastate transmission lines exhibited any 
significant congestion.  The other five of the intrastate transmission lines exhibited extremely 
low levels of congestion.   
The congestion on all the interstate interconnectors justifies an Inter State comparison of the 
average wholesale spot prices.  Section 1 compares average wholesale spot prices between 
the States of the NEM to identify system wide effects and Section 2 examines prices on 
individual nodes in detail to evaluate the observations made in Section 1 in higher resolution.  
Section 2 focuses on ‘Representative State Nodes’ for each State because there is little 
Intrastate congestion to induce price difference between nodes within a State.  Additionally, 
the ‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’ are discussed.  
3.1 interstate comparison to identify system wide effects 
Table 2 presents the average wholesale spot prices for the States.  We examined system 
wide patterns using the lowest and highest wind penetration scenarios, A and E, and the first 
and last projection years, 2014 and 2025 for each of the baseline weather years 2010 to 
2012.  Three effects can explain the change in wholesale spot prices.  
 Wind penetration effect shown between scenario A and E 
 Weather effect shown between the baseline years 2010 to 2012 
 Growth in demand effect shown between the projection years 2014 to 2025 
The following three sections discuss these effects using data from Table 2. The ANEM 
model (Wild et al. 2015) calculates half hourly spot prices for each node in the NEM.    The 
State prices in Table 2 are the average of the State’s nodal average wholesale spot prices. 
The ANEM model’s average wholesale spot prices in Table 3 for Queensland (QLD) are 
higher than that for the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO 2015a).  Six factors 
explain this disparity.   
 QLD has a heavier reliance on gas generation than New South Wales (NSW) and the 
ANEM model assumes high gas prices for all gas-fired generators based on current 
and future spot market prices associated with benchmarked internationally traded 
gas prices.  In reality, many gas-fired generator companies have existing contracts 
for gas supply negotiated when the gas supply in the NEM was for domestic 
consumption only.  This domestic only market resulted in much lower gas prices.  
Currently, international Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) prices determine spot gas prices in 
the NEM because domestic gas is liquefied for exported as LNG.  New gas supply 
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contracts will reflect the higher gas spot prices determined in the international LNG 
market once these low gas price contracts expire.  These expiries will bring closer 
correspondence between the prices of the AEMO (2015a) and the ANEM model.  
 QLD has the lowest wind penetration of all the States, so is least able to benefit from 
wind power’s low marginal cost of electricity in Scenario E. 
 The electricity demand projections for 2014-2025 for QLD tend to be more bullish 
than for other States.  This reflects expected increased demand associated with 
mining and mineral processing industries, including LNG exports.  
 The ANEM model assumes the short run marginal cost of generation increases at an 
inflation rate of 2.5% p.a. over the period 2014-2025.  The high cost of gas 
generation maintains Queensland’s position with the highest average wholesale 
electricity spot price.   
 The ANEM model uses a Direct Current Optimal Power Flow (DC OPF) model of the 
NEM and assumes generators use marginal costing to produce supply offers.  In 
reality, generators in the NEM use strategic bidding and produce supply offers above 
marginal costs. This strategic behaviour typically produces higher wholesale spot 
prices than the ANEM model calculates.  
 The ANEM model assumes that baseload gas generation such as Natural Gas 
Combined Cycle (NGCC) plant continue to operate in this role, albeit at higher gas 
prices.  Baseload plant has non-zero minimum stable operating levels.  If baseload 
plant dispatches at their minimum stable operating levels, nodal prices approximate 
an average of the marginal costs of coal and NGCC plant.  This average price is 
below the marginal cost of the marginal NGCC plant.  However, if the plant dispatch 
above their minimum stable operating level, they will set the nodal price at a higher 
level much closer to their marginal cost.  
However, the possibility of importing cheaper electricity from NSW may ameliorate QLD 
dependence on gas generation.  The modelling results illustrate how higher gas prices 
increase wholesale electricity prices and how wind generation works to insulate wholesale 
electricity prices from the impact of rising gas prices via the merit order effect.    
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Table 2: The average wholesale spot prices for wind penetration scenarios A and E, the projection year 
2014 and 2025 and baseline years 2010 to 2012 
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Wind 
scenario 
Baseline 
Year 
Projection 
Year 
NSW QLD SA TAS VIC NEM 
a 2010 2014 23.21 60.05 44.45 47.39 41.65 41.81 
a 2010 2025 38.56 167.89 102.02 75.23 97.56 91.30 
a 2011 2014 20.05 49.79 40.34 45.03 36.91 36.95 
a 2011 2025 29.48 161.19 80.97 72.19 75.55 80.40 
a 2012 2014 23.83 64.81 54.54 50.99 51.21 46.59 
a 2012 2025 39.66 165.45 132.05 79.31 134.57 101.69 
e 2010 2014 14.15 45.05 9.48 27.75 13.42 22.82 
e 2010 2025 21.31 107.04 18.86 43.70 27.47 44.80 
e 2011 2014 11.94 32.71 7.13 26.18 10.86 18.53 
e 2011 2025 17.83 98.53 14.06 40.31 20.76 39.60 
e 2012 2014 14.32 44.20 10.27 25.92 14.81 22.62 
e 2012 2025 21.25 117.98 20.39 41.25 31.47 47.40 
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3.1.1 Wind penetration effect shown between Scenarios A and E 
Figure 1 and Table 3 show the average price of each State for the wind penetration 
Scenarios A and E.  Scenario A is no wind generation.  In contrast, Scenario E contains all 
existing and planned wind generation that would meet the 2020 LRET.  Figure 1 and Table 3 
are the average across the baseline weather years 2010 to 2012 and the projection growth 
years 2014 and 2025.  The largest decrease in average price is just over $62/MWh for South 
Australia (SA) and the smallest decrease is just over $12/MWh for NSW.  The other States 
fall between these two extremes.  QLD has the smallest percentage decrease in average 
prices at 33% and SA the largest percentage decrease.  These percentage point price 
decreases reflect the relative number of windfarms within each State and adjoining States.  
The high congestion on the interconnectors that link State transmission grids, maintains the 
large variation in average spot prices between States (Bell et al. 2015a).  The wind 
penetration effect is by far the largest of the three effects for average wholesale spot price.  
This demonstrates existence of the merit order effect associated with the role-out of wind 
power in the NEM.  This wind penetration effect is also the largest of the three effects for 
transmission line congestion (Bell et al. 2015a).   
Figure 1: Average prices for each State for the wind power scenarios A and E 
 
 
Table 3: Average prices for each State for the wind power scenarios A and E 
States a e Average 
NSW 29.13 16.80 22.97 
QLD 111.53 74.25 92.89 
SA 75.73 13.36 44.55 
TAS 61.69 34.19 47.94 
VIC 72.91 19.80 46.35 
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3.1.2 Weather effect shown between the baseline years 2010 to 2012 
Figure 2 and Table 4 show the average wholesale price for the baseline years 2010 to 2012.  
We attribute most of the variation in demand in the years 2010 to 2012 to variation in 
weather between these years.  Figure 2 is the average across the wind scenarios A and E 
and the projection growth years 2014 and 2025.  Tasmania (TAS) has the smallest change 
in average wholesale spot price induced by the weather effect and Victoria (VIC) the largest.  
The weather effect is the smallest effect of the three for wholesale spot prices. 
Figure 2: Average price for each State for the baseline years 2010 to 2012 
 
 
Table 4: Average price for each State for the baseline years 2010 to 2012 
States 2010 2011 2012 Average 
NSW 24.31 19.83 24.76 22.97 
QLD 95.01 85.55 98.11 92.89 
SA 43.70 35.62 54.31 44.55 
TAS 48.52 45.93 49.37 47.94 
VIC 45.03 36.02 58.02 46.35 
NEM 50.18 43.87 54.58 49.54 
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3.1.3 Growth in electricity demand effect shown between projection years 
2014-25 
Figure 3 and Table 5 show the average wholesale spot price for the projection years 2014 
and 2025.  We model the demand for electricity to grow from 2014 to 2025.  Hence, a growth 
effect can account for the change in average wholesale spot price.  Figure 3 is the average 
across the wind scenarios A and E and baseline years 2010 to 2012.  We would expect the 
growth in demand to put upward pressure on wholesale spot price, which is evident in all the 
States of the NEM.  QLD experiences the largest increase in wholesale spot price both 
nominally and as a proportion.  This reflects the more bullish projection assumptions for 
QLD’s demand compared with the other states.  Additionally, in contrast, the relatively higher 
penetration of wind generation in the other States helps moderate the effect of the growth in 
electricity demand to increased wholesale spot prices.  As discussed, QLD’s higher reliance 
on gas generation exacerbates its growth in average wholesale spot prices.  The growth 
effect is the second largest of the three effects for wholesale spot prices. 
Figure 3: Average price for each State for the projection years 2014-2025 
 
 
Table 5: Average price for each State for the projection years 2014-2025 
States 2014 2025 Average 
NSW 17.92 28.02 22.97 
QLD 49.43 136.35 92.89 
SA 27.70 61.39 44.55 
TAS 37.21 58.67 47.94 
VIC 28.14 64.57 46.35 
NEM 31.56 67.53 49.54 
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3.1.4 Comparing the effect of the five wind scenarios on State Prices 
Figure 4 on the next page shows the average wholesale spot price for the wind penetration 
scenarios A to E.  These scenarios are progressive increases in wind power penetration.  
Figure 4 presents the five wind scenarios.  In contrast, Figure 1 only shows Scenarios A and 
E.  The average wholesale spot prices shown in both Figure 1 and Figure 4 are the average 
across the baseline weather years 2010 to 2012 and the projection growth years 2014 and 
2025.  The effect of increasing wind power from Scenario A to E on the average wholesale 
spot prices is to decrease prices for all States.  This demonstrates the merit order effect of 
wind power.  However, the rate of prices decrease varies greatly between States. 
Figure 5 also on the next page shows the additional annual energy from wind power for each 
wind penetration scenario for each State.  Figure 5 is based on the ‘Windfarm Annual 
Production’ figures in Wild et al. (2015, tbl. 5).  Note Scenario A “no wind power” has zero 
wind power output but is included to ensure the legend colour coding of the Wind Power 
Scenarios is the same on both Figure 4 and Figure 5 to allow easier comparison.  
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 helps to explain the drivers for the changes in the average 
wholesale spot prices for each State but the picture is incomplete without considering the 
congestion on the interstate interconnectors. 
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 for the introduction of wind that is from Scenario A to B, 
we find price decreases correspond with the relative size of the introduction of 
windfarm energy production to State energy demand that is SA, VIC, TAS, NSW and 
QLD.  We use the relative size of windfarm energy production to State energy 
demand because a windfarm would a have proportional effect on prices.  For instance, the 
same sized windfarm in NSW and TAS would have a lesser effect on prices in NSW 
because NSW’s demand is about six times larger than TAS.  This simplifying assumption is 
valid because the congestion on the interconnectors maintains price differentials between 
States.  
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 for increasing wind power from Scenario A to E, we find 
diminishing returns in the reduction of prices from investing in more wind power.  VIC, NSW 
and SA more clearly exhibit this diminishing returns effect.   Building more capacity into the 
interconnectors could overcome this diminishing returns effect provided the wind power 
between States is uncorrelated.  Table 6 shows that there is little wind power correlation 
between States, so increasing interconnector capacity will overcome diminishing returns on 
price reduction for increasing wind power.  However, Table 6 also shows that there is even 
less correlation between wind power and electricity demand.  This suggests the requirement 
for both energy storage and increasing the capacity of the interconnectors to maximise the 
reductions in prices from wind power.  The optimal mix of increasing interconnector capacity 
and energy storage is a question left for further research discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.5.  
There are strong profits motive for existing fossil fuel generators to oppose such 
augmentation discussed in Section 4.2.  
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Figure 4: Comparing the effect of the five wind scenarios on prices in each States 
 
Figure 5: Comparing the additional annual wind power for each wind penetration scenario for each State  
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Table 6: Correlation of wind speed and demand 
 
Demand Wind speed 
NSW QLD SA TAS VIC NSW SA TAS VIC 
Demand 
NSW 1         
QLD 0.83 1        
SA 0.81 0.67 1       
TAS 0.72 0.54 0.58 1      
VIC 0.89 0.75 0.85 0.78 1     
Wind 
Speed 
NSW 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.1 0.07 1    
SA -0.16 -0.08 -0.07 -0.15 -0.16 0.34 1   
TAS -0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.31 0.24 1  
VIC -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 0 -0.05 0.44 0.64 0.47 1 
(Source: Bannister & Wallace 2011, p. 15) 
QLD is absent from the wind speed analysis in Table 6.  QLD had little planned wind power 
at the time of Table 6’s construction, which could account for QLD’s omission.  Nevertheless, 
QLD is on the periphery of the NEM, which would act to reduce its wind speed correlation 
with the other States, as would its tropical climate.  This observation is further reinforced by 
the fact that the best wind resources in QLD are thought to be located in Far North QLD, 
which is thousands of kilometres from the nearest neighbouring southern state of NSW.  
Additionally, QLD is the only State in the NEM that ignores day light saving.  This would 
reduce its demand correlation with other States.  Both these factors would help reinforce 
wind power’s roles in reducing wholesale spot prices in QLD and the NEM when increasing 
the capacity of the interconnectors. 
We (Bell et al. 2015d) performed a correlation of wind speed and electricity demand 
including QLD and found the results in Table 6 slightly overestimated the wind speed 
correlation between each state and overestimated electricity demand correlation between 
each state but under estimated the wind speed-electricity demand correlation between each 
state.  Overall these results undervalue the contribution of wind power to the NEM system 
stability and underestimate the requirement for interconnection augmentation for the NEM to 
avail itself of the benefits of higher penetrations of wind power.  The inclusion of QLD in our 
study also improved the ability of wind power to contribute to system stability and meet 
changes demand. 
We investigate the augmentation of the NEM’s electricity grid in two further reports (Bell et al. 
2015b, 2015c).  These reports perform a sensitivity analysis on the effect of NEMLink on 
congestion and wholesale spot prices under the 5 wind penetration scenarios.  NEMLink is a 
major augmentation of the Australian National Electricity Market’s transmission grid outlined 
in the National Transmission Network Development Plan (AEMO 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 
2011b).  The problems identified in SA largely disappear under a NEMLINK argumentation.  
  
The effect of increasing the number of wind turbine generators on wholesale spot prices in the  
Australian National Electricity Market from 2014 to 2025  
 
Page 21 
 
3.2 Detailed investigation of individual nodes 
In the previous section, the wind penetration effect was by far the largest, followed by the 
growth in electricity demand and the smallest being the weather effect.  Hence, the following 
presentation focuses on the largest effect but analysing individual nodes allows 
consideration of the two lesser effects.  Viewing the node diagrams in Wild et al. (2015, Figs. 
1-6)  while reading this section would aid comprehension for readers who are unfamiliar with 
the NEM’s topology.  Reviewing the average wholesale prices for the 52 nodes in the ANEM 
model is unnecessary because groups of nodes linked by uncongested transmission lines 
tend to follow the same price movements in magnitude and pattern.  Therefore, identifying 
these groups of nodes within each State’s network both provides an alternative view of 
transmission congestion and ‘Representative State Node’ analysis reduces needless 
repetition. 
Section 1 evaluates wholesale spot prices at each node within each State to identify a 
‘Representative State Node’ for each States and to identify ‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’ 
whose wholesale spot prices are at odds with the majority of other nodes in the State.  
Sections 2 analyses the ‘Representative State Nodes’.  Section 3 analyses the 
‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’ to elicit what dynamics cause their price behaviour to be at 
odds with the ‘Representative State Nodes’. 
3.2.1 Identifying representative and unrepresentative State Nodes 
Figure 6 shows NSW average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 
2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  The average wholesale spot 
prices fall neatly into two groups Node 12 (Lismore) and all the other nodes in NSW 
represented by Node 13 (Armidale).  Node 12 (Lismore) and Node 13 (Armidale) connect 
NSW to QLD via DirectLink and QNI, respectively. 
Figure 7 shows the QLD average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 
and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  The average wholesale 
spot prices fall neatly into four groups Node 7, Node 8, Node 11 and all the other nodes in 
QLD.  Node 8 (South West QLD) and Node 11 (Gold Coast) connect QLD to NSW via QNI 
and DirectLink, respectively.   Node 7 only slightly deviates from the ‘Representative State 
Node’ unlike Node 8 and 11 whose deviations are more considerable. 
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Figure 6: NSW average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
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Figure 7: QLD average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
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Figure 8 shows the SA average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 
and 2012.  Any node in the State of SA represents the average wholesale spot price of the entire State, excluding Node 35, which shows 
slightly higher prices under certain conditions.  The Heywood interconnector links Node 35 to VIC.  
Figure 8: SA average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
 
Figure 9 shows the TAS average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 
2011 and 2012.  Any node in the State of TAS represents the average wholesale spot price of the entire State.  Node 50 exhibits a slightly 
lower deviation from the ‘Representative State Node’.    
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Figure 9: TAS average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
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Figure 10 shows the VIC average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 
2011 and 2012.  The average wholesale spot price fall into four groups; Node 27, Node 28, Node 34 and the remaining Nodes 29 to 33.  Nodes 
27, 28 and 34 form the VIC end of the interconnection to NSW.  Node 34 also connects VIC to SA via the MurrayLink Interconnector.  
Figure 10: VIC average wholesale spot prices by node by projections years 2014 and 2025 and by weather baseline years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
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3.2.2 Representative State Nodes 
This section analyses the representative nodes of each State.  The ‘Representative State 
Nodes’ are those nodes that represent the same average wholesale spot price as most of 
the nodes in the State.  The ability to use representative nodes comes from a price islanding 
effect where the transmission network within each State have relatively little congestion but 
the interconnectors between States are relatively congested. Section 3.2.3 analyses the 
‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’.  Figure 11 compares the average wholesale spot price 
between each of the representative nodes.  Table 7 lists the NEM’s windfarms by State and 
Scenario.  The rank order by Annual Production for all Scenarios is NSW, VIC, SA, QLD and 
TAS.  Comparing Figure 11 and Table 7 helps to explain the decrease in average wholesale 
spot prices.  The remainder of the section discusses the representative nodes in more detail 
and the windfarm nodal location within each State to identify any potential contribution 
factors for the unrepresentative nodes. 
Figure 11: The representative nodes for each State in the NEM 
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Table 7: NEM Windfarms by State and Scenario 
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NSW 1,670 4,517 0.38 15,001 
b 350 666 0.36 2,090 
c 329 915 0.39 3,137 
d 580 1,722 0.39 5,964 
e 411 1,215 0.37 3,810 
QLD 328 936 0.41 3,497 
b 20 12 0.36 38 
c 25 75 0.40 263 
d 208 624 0.44 2,407 
e 75 225 0.40 789 
SA 1,152 3,052 0.38 10,885 
b 649 1,473 0.36 4,883 
c 193 579 0.41 2,149 
d 134 402 0.43 1,522 
e 176 598 0.44 2,331 
TAS 323 923 0.42 3,324 
b 118 308 0.42 1,134 
d 45 135 0.42 492 
e 160 480 0.40 1,698 
VIC 1,471 3,784 0.39 13,201 
b 592 1,223 0.38 4,072 
c 415 1,245 0.40 4,401 
d 464 1,316 0.40 4,728 
Total 4,944 13,212 0.39 45,907 
(Source: Wild et al. 2015, tbl. 5) 
3.2.2.1 QLD’s representative Node: Far North (Node 1) 
Figure 12 shows average wholesale spot price for QLD’s representative node, Node 1 (Far 
North).  Section 3.2.3 discusses QLD’s unrepresentative nodes that are Nodes 8 and 11.  
Comparing Figure 12 and Table 8 shows a high correspondence between reduction in 
average wholesale spot price and Annual Production (GW) from wind generation. The high 
degree of nodal price equalisation within QLD reflects the fact that there is little if any 
congestion on intra-state transmission branches. Apart from Node 8 (South West QLD), this 
lack of congestion produces a common marginal generation unit within QLD and the 
observed price equalisation across QLD’s Nodes.  Table 8 shows that only the Far North 
(Node 1) and Tarong (Node 7) have windfarms in QLD.  Node 1 in the Far North is unlikely 
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to affect the unrepresentative QLD Nodes (Nodes 8 and 11) but a transmission line links 
Node 8 (South West) and Node 7 (Tarong), so the windfarms on Node 7 could affect the 
prices on Node 8.  In concurrence, Figure 7 shows Node 7’s price’s deviate only slightly from 
those of the ‘Representative State Node.’ 
Figure 12: QLD’s representative Node: Far North (Node 1) excludes Nodes 8 and 11 
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Table 8: QLD Windfarms by Node and Scenario 
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b 20 12 0.36 38 
1 20 12 0.36 38 
c 25 75 0.40 263 
1 25 75 0.40 263 
d 208 624 0.44 2,407 
1 92 276 0.43 1,073 
7 116 348 0.44 1,334 
e 75 225 0.40 789 
7 75 225 0.40 789 
Total 328 936 0.41 3,497 
(Source: Wild et al. 2015, tbl. 5) 
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3.2.2.2 NSW’s representative Node: Armidale (Node 13) excludes Node 12 
Figure 13 shows average wholesale spot price for NSW’s representative node, Armidale 
(Node 13).  Section 3.2.3 discusses NSW’s unrepresentative node that is Node 12.   
Comparing Figure 13 and Table 9 shows a high correspondence between reduction in 
average wholesale spot price and Annual Production (GW) from wind generation.  In general, 
the overall trend towards lower wholesale spot prices in NSW when compared to the other 
States is a combination of less bullish demand projections over 2014 to 2025, a supply of 
cheap black coal generation and increasing wind power crowding out more expensive gas 
and hydro generation.  Note that the wind penetration scenarios in NSW have a more even 
temporal penetration of wind power than QLD.   
Figure 13: Armidale (Node 13) representing all NSW Nodes except Node 12 
 
Table 9 shows that seven of the fifteen nodes in NSW have windfarms.  This makes the 
windfarms more spatially dispersed than QLD.  The only unrepresentative Node in NSW is 
Node 12 (Lismore), which lacks any windfarms, but the adjoining Node 13 (Armidale) has 
the largest cumulative annual production in NSW.  Node 13 also adjoins the 
Unrepresentative QLD Node 8 via QNI.   
Noteworthy, the NSW Node 26 (Tumut) possess a relatively large amount of wind power, 
see Table 9, and links NSW to all three ‘Unrepresentative VIC Nodes’ 27, 28 and 34.  The 
large Silverton Windfarm adjoins Node 26. 
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Table 9: NSW Windfarms by Node and Scenario 
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b 350 666 0.36 2,090 
20 15 10 0.34 30 
23 132 277 0.36 890 
25 203 379 0.37 1,170 
c 329 915 0.39 3,137 
13 25 75 0.39 256 
21 33 99 0.40 346 
23 46 138 0.36 438 
25 141 351 0.37 1,145 
26 84 252 0.43 951 
d 580 1,722 0.39 5,964 
13 293 879 0.39 3,009 
20 106 318 0.40 1,105 
21 38 114 0.35 350 
23 35 105 0.36 334 
24 18 36 0.39 124 
26 90 270 0.44 1,043 
e 411 1,215 0.37 3,810 
21 288 864 0.36 2,687 
24 123 351 0.38 1,123 
Total 1670 4,517 0.38 15,001 
(Source: Wild et al. 2015, tbl. 5) 
3.2.2.3 SA’s representative node: Greater Adelaide (Node 37) 
Figure 14 shows average wholesale spot price for the ‘Representative SA Node’ 37 (Greater 
Adelaide).  Excepting, Node 35 exhibits slightly higher prices under certain conditions.  
Comparing Figure 14  and Table 10 shows a high correspondence between reduction in 
average wholesale spot price and Annual Production (GW) from wind power.  In the States 
of the NEM, SA has the largest installation of wind power by Annual Production in Scenario 
B and consequently a large reduction in price from Scenario A to B.  SA has cumulative 
windfarms on five of its seven nodes by Scenario E but over half of the wind power is 
concentrated at Node 39 (Mid North).  The ‘Unrepresentative SA’ Node 35 has four wind 
farms installed in Scenario B and connects SA to VIC via the Heywood interconnector that 
has the least congestion of all the interconnectors  (Bell et al. 2015a).  Both factors would 
account for node 35’s slight deviation in prices from those of the ‘Representative SA Node 
37’. 
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Figure 14: Greater Adelaide (Node 37) representing all nodes in SA 
 
Table 10: SA Windfarms by Node and Scenario 
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b 649 1,473 0.36 4,883 
35 135 325 0.32 921 
37 23 35 0.30 91 
39 423 978 0.40 3,487 
41 68 136 0.32 384 
c 193 579 0.41 2,149 
39 193 579 0.41 2,149 
d 134 402 0.43 1,522 
39 75 225 0.43 842 
40 59 177 0.44 681 
e 176 598 0.44 2,331 
37 176 598 0.44 2,331 
Total 1152 3,052 0.38 10,885 
(Source: Wild et al. 2015, tbl. 5) 
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3.2.2.4 VIC’s representative node: Melbourne (Node 32) excludes 27, 28 and 34 
Figure 15 shows average wholesale spot price for the ‘Representative VIC Node 32’ 
Melbourne.  Section 3.2.3 discusses the Unrepresentative VIC Nodes 27, 28 and 34.  
Comparing Figure 15  and Table 11 shows decreasing returns between reduction in average 
wholesale spot price and Annual Production (GW) from wind generation.  VIC has an even 
installation of wind power throughout Scenarios B, C and D of about 4,000 GW by Annual 
Production but there are diminishing returns on average spot price reduction.   
The Unrepresentative VIC Node 34 possesses about half of VIC’s cumulative wind power 
Annual Production for all Scenarios.  Node 34 is also at the junction of two low MW capacity 
interconnectors VIC-NSW (Line 37 - Tumut-Regional VIC) and VIC-SA (MurrayLink) that 
have high levels of congestion (Bell et al. 2015a).  Section 3.2.3.2 discusses further the 
Unrepresentative VIC Node 34’s high concentration of windfarms and interconnectedness.  
Figure 15: Melbourne (Node 32) representing all VIC nodes except 27, 28 and 34 
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Table 11: VIC Windfarms by Node and Scenario 
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b 592 1,223 0.38 4,072 
30 70 140 0.38 476 
33 280 685 0.38 2,264 
34 242 399 0.37 1,332 
c 415 1,245 0.40 4,401 
33 98 294 0.41 1,053 
34 317 951 0.39 3,348 
d 464 1,316 0.40 4,728 
32 9 27 0.40 94 
33 240 644 0.41 2,367 
34 215 645 0.40 2,268 
Total 1471 3,784 0.39 13,201 
(Source: Wild et al. 2015, tbl. 5) 
 
3.2.2.5 TAS’s representative Node: George Town (Node 42) 
Figure 16 shows average wholesale spot price for the ‘Representative TAS Node 42’ George 
Town.  Node 50 (Tarraleah) exhibits slightly lower prices in Scenario E.  This reflects the 
additional dispatch of the Cattle Hill Windfarm in Scenario E. 
Comparing Figure 16  and Table 10 show a high correspondence between reduction in 
average wholesale spot price and Annual Production (GW) from wind generation.   The 
exception is Scenario C that witnesses a reduction in average prices without any additional 
deployment of wind power in TAS in Scenario C.  However, Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11 
show that NSW, VIC and SA have sizable deployments of wind power in Scenario C and 
there is an increase in congestion in BassLink in Scenario C, possibly indicating the 
importation of power into TAS from VIC.  Section 3.2.5 in the project’s transmission report 
(Bell et al. 2015a) discusses this further.   
The lower average price in Node 50 (Tarraleah) in Scenario E is a combination of more than 
doubling TAS wind power in Scenario E (Table 10 ) at Node 50 and the congestion on Line 
64 (Tarraleah-Waddamana) discussed in Section 3.2.5 of the project’s transmission report 
(Bell et al. 2015a). 
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Figure 16: George Town (Node 42) representing all TAS Nodes 
 
Table 12: TAS Windfarms by Node and Scenario 
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b 118 308 0.42 1,134 
44 62 140 0.41 501 
46 56 168 0.43 633 
d 45 135 0.42 492 
42 12 36 0.43 137 
45 33 99 0.41 355 
e 160 480 0.40 1,698 
50 160 480 0.40 1,698 
Total 323 923 0.42 3,324 
(Source: Wild et al. 2015, tbl. 5) 
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3.2.3 Unrepresentative State Nodes 
This section analyses the unrepresentative nodes of each State.  Those nodes whose 
average wholesale spot price deviates from the average wholesale spot price exhibited by 
most of the other nodes in the State.  Most of the unrepresentative nodes exist around the 
interconnectors.  Therefore, we analyse these unrepresentative nodes in groups around their 
interconnectors.  Section 1 discusses the QNI and DirectLink group of unrepresentative 
nodes.  Section 2 discusses the interconnectors NSW-VIC and Murray Link group of 
unrepresentative nodes. 
3.2.3.1 QNI and DirectLink Interconnector terminal Nodes 8, 11, 12 and 13 
Explaining the Unrepresentative State Nodes 8, 11 and 12 in Figure 17 requires considering 
(1) the topology about the QNI and DirectLink interconnectors, (2) the deployment of 
windfarms in adjacent nodes and (3) the congestion on QNI and DirectLink.  
Figure 17: QNI and DirectLink topology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      (Source: Wild et al. 2015, figs. 2 & 3) 
 
Figure 17 shows the two interconnectors, QNI and Directlink, connecting QLD and NSW.  
Notably, there is mesh structure connecting the rest of QLD to the interconnectors.  In 
contrast, a single transmission line connects the rest of NSW.  Bell et al. (2015a, sec. 3.2.1) 
discuss the complementary congestion on QNI and DirectLink.  The congestion on QNI 
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decreases with increasing wind power in both Node 13 (Armidale) and Node 7 (Tarong).  
QNI would have to transfer less power into both QLD and NSW because Nodes 7 and 13 
can more readily meet demand within their respective States.  Lower congestion on QNI 
would also imply a greater tendency towards price equalisation between Nodes 8 and 13.  
This equalisation is shown in Figure 18 that compares the average wholesale spot prices for 
the terminal nodes on QNI and Directlink. 
Figure 18: QNI and DirectLink Interconnector terminal Nodes 8, 11, 12 and 13 
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 In contrast to the decrease in congestion QNI with increases in wind power, the congestion 
on DirectLink increases with increasing wind power.  This reflects increased power flows 
from wind generation at Armidale flowing into QLD via the Lismore node and Directlink.  This 
increase power flow quickly congests DirectLink’s small MW thermal limit.  The congestion 
maintains a price divergence between the Gold Coast and the Lismore node shown in Figure 
18. 
Figure 18 shows the average wholesale price of the Representative QLD Node 1 to 
benchmark the Unrepresentative QLD Nodes 8 and 11. The Unrepresentative QLD Node 8’s 
prices are much lower and Node 11’s are higher relative to the Representative QLD Node 1.  
The prices of the Unrepresentative QLD Node 8 more closely follow the prices of the 
Representative NSW Node 13’s prices.  They are both terminal nodes for QNI.  
Figure 18 also shows the average wholesale price of the Representative NSW Node 13 to 
benchmark the Unrepresentative NSW Node 12.  Node 12 has some of the lowest prices in 
the NEM, starting in Scenario A pre-existing any wind power.  The increase in wind power 
has further reduced the prices.  The growth in demand for projection years 2014 to 2025 has 
also increased congestion on DirectLink (Bell et al. 2015a, Sec. 3.2.1) further reducing Node 
12’s prices and increasing Node 11’ s prices. 
QNI’s congestion is projected to decrease and DirectLink’s congestion is projected to 
increase.  Increasing the capacity on DirectLink would increase the prices on Node 12 and 
decrease the prices on Node 11.  In effect, the prices at these Unrepresentative State Nodes 
would move closer to their respective Representative State Nodes.  
Section 4.2 discusses further the QNI-DirectLink is grouping. 
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3.2.3.2 MurrayLink and NSW-VIC Interconnector terminal Nodes 27, 28 and 34 
Figure 19 shows the MurrayLink and NSW-VIC interconnectors and their terminal nodes.  
Coloured red are both the Unrepresentative VIC Nodes 27, 28, 34 and congested 
interconnector Lines 37  and 48 (Bell et al. 2015a, Secs. 3.2.2 & 3.2.4). 
Figure 19: MurrayLink and NSW-VIC Interconnector terminal nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Wild et al. 2015, figs. 3, 4 & 5) 
 Figure 19 asterisks Node 34 (Regional VIC) with 50% of Vic’s wind power.  In a more 
complete explanation, Node 34 by Scenario D has about 50% of VIC Annual Energy 
Production from wind power and number of WTG.  See Table 11.   
Figure 20 shows the average wholesale spot prices for the Unrepresentative VIC Nodes 27, 
28 and 34.  The Representative VIC Node 32 is included for benchmarking.  Node 34 shows 
slightly higher or equal prices as the Representative Node 32.  Both Node 27 and 28 exhibit 
prices above and below the Representative VIC Node 32.  The low congestion on the NSW-
VIC interconnectors Lines 35 and 36 means prices in the VIC Nodes 27 and 28 will more 
closely match those prices in the NSW Node 26 (Tumut). 
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Figure 20: Benchmarking Unrepresentative VIC Nodes 27, 28 and 34 with Representative Node 32 
 
Figure 21 shows the three Nodes: 26, 38 and 34 that are the terminal nodes for MurrayLink 
and NSW-VIC (Line 37) interconnectors.  These nodes are located in NSW, SA and VIC, 
respectively.  Figure 21 shows the average wholesale spot prices for these nodes.  There is 
sufficient difference in their average wholesale spot prices for electricity exports from SA and 
NSW to VIC.  This export potential is based purely on average prices without considering the 
additional imports and exports stemming from the lack of correlation in wind power between 
the States. 
Figure 21: MurrayLink and NSW-VIC interconnector nodal price comparison 
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combination of single and double circuit 220 kV networks that connect from Regional VIC to 
both the Dederang and Melbourne nodes.  Thus the whole network can be characterised as 
low voltage, low thermal capacity network that, as a result, is prone to congestion.  This 
situation can be contrast with the higher voltage 500 kV and 500/330 kV network backbones 
found in VIC and NSW.  Section 4.2 discusses further the MurrayLink-NSW-VIC 
interconnector grouping. 
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4 Discussion 
We have conducted a sensitivity analysis of the effect of increasing the number of wind 
turbine generators (WTG) on average wholesale spot prices in the Australian National 
Electricity Market from Scenario A that is no WTG or 0% to Scenario E that is sufficient WTG 
to meet the 2020 41TWh Large Renewable Energy Target.  The sensitivity analysis also 
considered the effect of weather and electricity demand growth on average wholesale spot 
prices.  We used simulations from the Australian National Electricity Market (ANEM) Model 
(Wild et al. 2015) to perform the sensitivity analysis.  This reports builds on insights gained in 
the project’s transmission congestion report (Bell et al. 2015a) that also uses the ANEM 
model and the five wind penetration Scenarios A to E. 
4.1 Interstate comparison to identify system wide effects 
In an interstate comparison, we investigated the effect of three factors on the average 
wholesale spot prices.  These factors include (1) a growth in electricity demand using the 
projection years 2014 and 2025, (2) weather using the baseline years 2010 to 2012 and (3) 
wind power using the five wind power penetration Scenarios A to E.  We found that wind 
power has the largest effect on prices followed by growth in demand and finally the weather 
effect, see Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3.  In comparison, the congestion report (Bell et al. 
2015a) finds that wind power still has the largest effect but the weather effect is larger than 
the growth effect.  
Wind Power has both environmental and economic benefits that are reducing both 
emissions and wholesale spot prices.  The average wholesale spot prices of all States 
decrease with an increase in wind power from Scenario A to E.  See Figure 4.  Wind power 
reduces average wholesale spot prices despite any induced transmission line congestion.  
Two questions arise from this observation. (1) Why are we not experiencing a decrease in 
retail electricity prices given the downward pressure on wholesale spot prices induced by 
wind power? (2) How do we reduce the transmission congestion to enhance wind power’s 
geographic reach and ability to reduce wholesale spot prices and carbon emissions further?  
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 address the second question.   
The first question addresses why retailers are not passing on the savings induced by wind 
power.  VIC has a deregulated and privatised retail sector and the other States have 
regulated retail price.  Benchmarking VIC’s retail prices against other State retail prices 
helps evaluated the efficacy of privatisation and deregulation.  The management of some 
electricity retail companies promote VIC as a successful trial of deregulation and 
privatisation.  However, in an independent study Molyneaux and Foster (2014) find the retail 
margin in VIC is higher than in NSW and QLD, see Figure 22, but the retail prices in NSW 
and VIC are about equal because the cost of distribution and transmission in VIC is much 
lower than in NSW.  VIC should have the lowest cost network per capita in the NEM 
because VIC is the State with the highest population density in the NEM and a higher 
density population makes distribution and transmission relatively less costly, see Table 13.  
Therefore, using VIC to evaluate the efficacy of deregulation and privatisation is misleading 
unless VIC’s naturally low network costs are considered.  In this case, the retailers are 
absorbing the wind power induced decreases in wholesale spot prices with increases in 
profit margins. 
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Figure 22: A 2013 breakdown of residential prices in Qld, NSW and VIC 
 
(Source: Molyneaux & Foster 2014) 
Table 13: Population density by State in the NEM: a relative indicator of network costs 
State Population 
2014 Sept.  
Estimated 
Area (km2) 
Density of Population 
People per square kilometre 
NSW  7,544,500 800,642 9.4 
QLD  4,740,900 1,730,648 2.7 
SA  1,688,700 983,482 1.7 
TAS  515,000 68,401 7.5 
VIC  5,866,300 227,416 25.8 
(Source: ABS 2015) 
Nepal and Jamasb (2015) investigate privatisation and deregulation in the electricity industry 
finding reality falls short of the benefits promised and a more nuanced approach to 
development is required.  They question the advocacy of following a one-size fits all plan in 
an idealised textbook theory of splitting the electricity industry into three segments: 
generation, network and retail, then privatising and deregulating.  This process is supposed 
to engender competition and bring about price reductions.  Ideally, competition to reduce 
prices occurs when there are numerous firms without the ability to exercise market power. 
Foster et al. (2013, sec. 10 ) discuss how the NEM compares to the market ideal and the 
prognosis for the NEM for increasing market power among the large retailer-generator 
companies who can leverage on their exiting market power.  Figure 23 shows the ownership 
patterns in the NEM by indicative share.  In the retail sectors, three large private retailer-
generation companies own over 70% of the entire retail market and nearly 90% of the 
private market.  This equates to considerable market power.   
In the generation market, the same three retailer-generator companies own about 64% of 
the private market but since 2013 AGL bought Delta & Mac Gen from the NSW Government.  
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This takes the same three retailer-generators market share of the private sector to 68%.  
These three retailer-generators are well positioned to buy the remaining State owned 
generation assets.  Without intervention, the situation will develop where the market power 
by the big three retail-generation companies will become similar to the market power exerted 
by Woolworths and Coles within the supermarket sector. 
We could define the “market” as both generation and retail sectors. In which case, splitting 
the combined retail-generator companies into separate retail and generation companies 
would reduce market share and enhance competition.  We leave the reader to calculate the 
market share of the big three retailer-generators in this expanded definition of a market. 
In comparison, the whole transmission and distribution system is a natural monopoly where 
multiple companies owning the system only adds extra overheads and fails to provide any 
competition to reduce prices.  Foster et al. (2013, sec. 10 ) discuss the multiple transmission 
and distribution problem in more detail. 
Figure 23: Ownership patterns in the NEM by indicative market share 
 
(Source: QCA 20013) 
Figure 24 shows that the three retail-generator companies are also among Australia’s largest 
emitters of greenhouse gases because they are the largest owners of fossil fuel generators.  
This poses a conflict of interest issue for these retail-generators because wind power is 
reducing the wholesale spot market prices, so reducing the profits of their large fossil fuel 
fleets.  AGL Energy became Australia’s largest emitter since buying MacQuarie Generation. 
In a further conflict of interest, any new wind project (or any other new renewable project) 
would usually require a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with one of the three retail-
generator companies before the project could obtain financing from banks.  Thus, the 
willingness of the three above companies to write PPA’s affects the development of 
renewable energy projects in the NEM. 
Additionally, the fossil fuel divestment movement is gaining pace both internationally and 
within Australia.  These three companies will be among those targeted for divestment.  
Divestment sends a message that burning fossil fuels is unethical, undermines the share 
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value of fossil fuel companies and compromises their ability to finance any further 
development. 
If Australia is to privatise and deregulate the retail electricity sector further to maintain 
downward pressure on retail prices, it makes sense to split the retail-generation companies 
beforehand for four reasons:  
 to improve competition within both the retail and generation sectors, 
 to prevent cross-subsidy between the sectors,  
 to make the retail sector less vulnerable to fossil fuel divestment, and 
 to reduce the market power of those fossil fuel companies with conflict of interest with 
wind power. 
Figure 24: Australia’s Top Greenhouse Gas emitters 
 
(Source: CER 2015)  
4.2 Detailed investigation of individual nodes  
In Section 3.2.1, we identify nodes in each State whose average wholesale spot prices can 
represent most of the other nodes in the State, the ‘Representative State Nodes’.  We also 
identify those nodes whose average prices are at odds with most of the other nodes in the 
State, the ‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’. 
In Section 3.2.2, in an interstate comparison of ‘Representative State Nodes’ prices, we find 
an islanding effect between States where each State maintains its own price levels.  This 
finding is consistent with high levels of congestion found on most of the interconnectors in 
our transmission congestion report (Bell et al. 2015a).  We also find a high correlation 
between increases in wind power within each State and decreases in the average wholesale 
spot prices of the ‘Representative State Node’ within each State.  These findings suggest 
little intrastate transmission line congestion.  Our congestion report (Bell et al. 2015a) 
corroborates this inference. 
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In Section 3.2.3, we find all ‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’ are also terminal nodes for the 
interconnectors.  These ‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’ form two groups (1) those around 
the QLD-NSW interconnectors QNI and DirectLink shown in Figure 17 and (2) those about 
the MurrayLink and NSW-VIC (Tumut-Regional VIC) interconnectors shown in Figure 19.   
The QLD-NSW interconnectors, QNI and DirectLink, shown in Figure 17 have an interesting 
topology that causes the congestion on QNI and DirectLink to act in a complementary 
pattern.  Increases in wind power from Scenario A to E increases the congestion on 
DirectLink but decreases congestion on QNI (Bell et al. 2015a, fig. 5). The topology that 
causes this associated behaviour is the single transmission that links Node 13 (Armidale) to 
the rest of NSW.  In contrast, there is a mesh of Nodes and Lines connecting the rest of QLD 
to QNI and DirectLink with a minimum of two lines.   Compounding this basic congestion 
pattern are the high concentrations of windfarms on Node 7 (Tarong, QLD) and Node 13 
(Armidale, NSW).   
Regarding average wholesale prices, Figure 18 shows that Node 12 (Lismore, NSW) 
experiences the lowest prices in the NEM and these prices turn negative during growth in 
electricity demand from 2014 to 2025.  In comparison, QLD is likely to experience the largest 
growth in electricity demand and prices in the NEM.  The congestion on QNI and DirectLink 
requires addressing for QLD to benefit from the more abundant wind power and lower 
wholesale spot price electricity in the other States of the NEM. There are the additional 
benefits that QLD being tropical and on the periphery of the NEM, its wind speed and 
demand are less correlated.  Any congestion solution requires considering the unique 
topology discussed. 
The ‘Unrepresentative VIC Nodes’ and the MurrayLink and NSW-VIC interconnectors shown 
in Figure 19 present a much simpler topology dynamic than QNI and DirectLink.  However, 
VIC is the central hub in the NEM shown in Figure 25, so the ‘Unrepresentative VIC Nodes’ 
have strategic importance.  In particular, the Unrepresentative VIC Node 34 (Regional VIC) 
links VIC to both NSW and SA via MurrayLink and Tumut-Regional VIC Interconnectors.  
This position makes the Unrepresentative VIC Node 34 the most strategic in the NEM.  In 
addition, Node 34 has 50% of VIC’s windfarms.  Both MurrayLink and NSW-VIC (Line 37) 
interconnectors show congestion (Bell et al. 2015a, secs. 3.2.2 & 3.2.4).  MurrayLink shows 
increasing congestion with increasing wind power from Scenario A to E from a few percent 
to over sixty percent.  In comparison, the congestion on NSW-VIC stays at about 50 percent  
The VIC and NSW intrastate transmission backbone has 500 kV and 500/330 kV capacity.  
In comparison, the interconnectors linking Node 34 to SA and NSW as well as Regional VIC 
itself has either a single or double circuit 132 or 220 kV network structure.  A simple solution 
is to increase the capacity on both interconnectors and intra-state linkages from Regional 
VIC to both the Dederang and Melbourne nodes. 
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Figure 25: VIC the NEM’s main hub 
 
 
 
 
 
AEMO (2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b) propose a high capacity backbone to the NEM grid 
called NEMLink that augments the existing transmission lines to address interstate 
congestion.  The ANEM model report (Wild et al. 2015, figs. 1-6) shows the transmission 
lines augmented in the NEMLink proposal in red.  NEMLink includes and eliminates 
congestion on the following three interconnectors QNI, MurrayLink and Regional VIC-Tumut 
NSW.  The AEMO (2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b) Regulatory Investment Tests for 
Transmission (RIT-T) for NEMLink excluded BassLink from the proposed NEMLink 
augmentation.  BassLink, being a HVDC submarine cable interconnector, is the most capital 
intensive of the all augmentations evaluated.  However, the RIT-T for the NEMLink also 
excluded the benefits of high penetrations of renewable energy.  We (Bell et al. 2015d) 
perform a wind speed and electricity demand correlation analysis for the NEM to determining 
wind turbine generators’ ability to meet electricity demand without energy storage.  We found 
a lack of correlation between the NEM’s peripheral states wind speeds and lack of 
correlation between the peripheral states’ electricity demand but a small correlation between 
the peripheral states wind speed and electrify demand.  NEMLink would enable the NEM to 
more fully avail itself of the benefits wind power.  This will become more valuable as the 
proportion of electricity from wind power increases towards the 2020 target and beyond.  We 
investigate the effect of NEMLink on transmission congestion and wholesale spot prices 
under the five wind penetration scenarios in two subsequent reports (Bell et al. 2015b, 
2015c). 
4.3 Gold-plated State networks and interconnectors as hosepipes  
The previous section discussed the uncongested intrastate transmission lines and the 
congested Inter State transmission lines inducing a price island effect for each State.  This 
observation supports Garnaut’s (2011, p. 2) claim regarding inadequate interconnectors and 
gold-plated State networks. 
“However, Nunn (2011) disagrees with Garnaut’s (2011, p. 38) assessment on 
gold plating intrastate transmission and under investing in interstate transmission.  
Nunn (2011) claims that Garnaut (2011, p. 38) has a “pipeline congestion” view 
where interconnectors are bottlenecks, so the implied solution is increase the 
capacity of the interconnectors.  Nunn (2011) demonstrates using binding 
constraint data on the transmission network that bottlenecks occur well before the 
pipeline limit.  Therefore, any part of the network can affect flows on the 
interconnectors.  Importantly, studying the frequency of the binding constraints 
shows that there lacks an obvious solution, as the binding constraints move 
around the network over time.  In agreement, the Australian Energy Market 
Commission (AEMC 2008, p. viii) states that empirical research from the National 
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Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) shows that congestion 
tends to be transitory and influenced significantly by network outages.  So, if 
bottlenecks in interstate transmissions are to be resolved, deeper integration of 
the interconnectors within the intrastate networks is required, which requires a 
whole of NEM focus rather than state focus.  
This difference in focus on state rather than whole of NEM appears to reconcile 
the gap between Garnaut’s (2011, p. 38) view on the institutional dynamics 
affecting interstate and intrastate transmission investment differently and Nunn’s 
(2011) demonstration using binding constraint data.  As part of the ongoing 
process to remedy newly identified problems on the transmission network, the 
AEMC (2008, p. vii) recommends that AEMO (2011c) provides information on 
congestion to enable participants to better manage risk.  In addition the AEMO 
(2011c) provides information on proposed transmission investments to reduce 
congestion.  However, the interactive map shows a single proposed upgrade to 
interstate transmission and the remainder of the proposed transmission 
developments are for intrastate, which is consistent with Garnaut’s (2011, p. 38) 
gold plating claim.  Furthermore, an AEMC (2008, p. iv) recommendation could 
account for some of this focus on intrastate development being to “clarify and 
strengthen the Rules governing the rights of generators who fund transmission 
augmentations as a means of managing congestion risk, so that in the future 
connecting parties make a contribution to those funded investments from which 
they will benefit”.  This rule leaves the interconnector used by many generators in 
an overtly complex situation, so favouring intrastate investment over interstate.” 
 
(Foster et al. 2013, sec. 6.1) 
4.4 Developing transmission to new wind resources 
In addition to the aforementioned dynamics favouring intrastate transmission over Inter State 
transmission, there are two issues impeding the introduction of new transmission to suitable 
areas for windfarms and other renewable energy sources: 
 
 Regulatory Investment Tests for Transmission (RIT-T); and 
 The fragmentation of the transmission companies and conflict of interest. 
 
“RIT-T requires that new investments meet peak demand.  This essentially puts 
the consideration of new transmission to sites suitable for renewable energy 
outside of the current RIT-T procedures.  The RIT-T procedure requires changing 
to incorporate economic viability tests for sites suitable for renewable energy.  
This change would align RIT-T with the broader government policies of 
addressing climate change. Foster et al. (2013, sec. 7) detail the transmission 
requirements to incorporate new sites suitable for renewable energy.  Foster et al. 
(2013, sec. 7.7) further discusses RIT-T. 
 
There is a conflict of interest in deploying the optimal size of transmission to new 
locations suitable for clusters of wind farms over who pays and who benefits.  
Foster et al. (2013, sec. 6.7) further discusses this conflict of interest.  
Additionally, there is the intergenerational aspect.  Since future generations will 
benefit from these long-term investments in transmission to new renewable sites, 
there is justification for long-term loans to finance these projects.  Bear in mind 
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that the State Governments funded the transmission for the existing coal fleet.  
The recommendation in Foster et al. (2013, sec. 10.1) goes some way to 
addressing both the financing and conflict of interest issues.” 
(Foster et al. 2013, sec. 10.3) 
4.5 Unregulated interconnectors with storage as congestion and 
intermittency management solutions 
We discuss unregulated interconnectors with energy storage as a further solution to 
transmission congestion.  AEMO (2015b) discusses how there are two types of 
interconnectors in the NEM: regulated and unregulated.  There is only one unregulated 
interconnector in the NEM that is BassLink.  The regulated interconnectors include all other 
interconnectors. 
A regulated interconnector is an interconnector that has passed the AER-devised 
regulatory test. TNSPs that own these interconnectors receive a fixed annual 
revenue based on the value of the asset as set by the AER, regardless of actual 
usage. The revenue is collected as part of the network charges included in the 
accounts of electricity end-users. 
An unregulated (or market) interconnector derives revenue by trading on the spot 
market. They do this by purchasing energy in a lower priced region and selling it 
to a higher priced region, or by selling the rights to revenue traded across the 
interconnector. Unregulated interconnectors are not required to undergo the 
regulatory test evaluation. 
(AEMO 2015b) 
The unregulated interconnector has the benefit of capturing the full benefit from introducing 
energy storage that is both transmission investment deferment and arbitrage profit from time 
shifting.  The transmission-energy storage combination also addresses the intermittence of 
renewable energy.  This combined approach to both congestion and intermittency 
management is worthy of investigation.  In further research, we could extend the ANEM 
model to investigate the benefits of unregulated interconnectors with storage on all NEM’s 
interconnectors.  
If this unregulated combination proved successful for interconnectors, we could also 
investigate the approach for intrastate transmission.  However, the wholesale spot pricing 
system in the NEM would require changing from pricing by State to pricing by node for 
transmission-energy storage entities to capture the full arbitrage value. 
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5 Conclusion 
We find the average wholesale spot price for all nodes in the NEM decrease when wind 
power increases from Scenario A that is ‘0% or no wind power’ to Scenario E that meets 
Australia’s Large Renewable Energy Target (LRET).  However, there is a failure to pass 
through these wind power induced wholesale spot price decreases to the retail prices.  We 
find in VIC, whose retail market is deregulated and privatised that the retail margin has 
simply increased under deregulation absorbing any wholesale spot price decrease induced 
by wind power (Section 4.1).  There is a requirement to improve competition before further 
privatisation and deregulation for the benefits of wind power to flow through to retail 
customers.  Increasing completion would also mitigate climate change by eliminating any 
cross subsidy from the retail sector to coal generators owned by retail-generator companies.  
The alternative to privatisation and deregulation is more enforceable and better regulation.  
We also find that wind power curtails wholesale spot price increases induced by demand 
growth and high gas prices. 
We find there is a need to address congestion in the interconnectors to reduce the NEM’s 
average wholesale spot prices induced by wind power further and improve the profitability of 
wind power.  The average wholesale spot prices by node provide us with an alternative 
perspective on congestion discussed in our congestion report (Bell et al. 2015a).  We find a 
single node’s average wholesale spot prices can represent the majority of nodal’ prices 
within each State and find price differentiation between States.  These observations are 
consistent with Garnaut’s (2011, p. 38) claim of gold-plating within State networks and 
underinvestment in interconnectors.  We identify regulations that perpetuate this situation 
and require amendment.  There is also a conflict of interest between coal generators within 
each State and expanding interconnector capacity to States with surplus wind power.  We 
also find a requirement to investigate the adequacy of the Regulatory Investment Tests for 
Transmission to allow the introduction of wind power in locations remote from the grid 
discussed in Section 4.4. 
We find the ‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’ are clustered about two groups of 
interconnectors.  The ‘Unrepresentative State Nodes’ are those that fail to follow price 
movements of the majority of other nodes within the State.  Their location is consistent with 
interconnector congestion and the topology of these groups.  The two groups are QNI-
DirectLink and MurrayLink-NSW-VIC interconnections.  The QNI-DirectLink grouping 
exhibits a complementary congestion pattern with increasing wind power due to single 
transmission line (Line 16) connecting the group to the rest of NSW.  This unusual topology 
needs consideration in congestion solutions.  The MurrayLink-NSW-VIC grouping is pivotal 
on Node 34 (Regional VIC).  This node has significant strategic value being the central hub 
in the NEM interconnector system.  Compounding its important is its significance for wind 
power.  Node 34 (Regional VIC) contains half of VIC’s wind power; Node 34 connects SA 
and NSW to VIC via MurrayLink and NSW\VIC Interconnector (line 37 and indirectly to lines 
35 and 36 via Dederang).  These three States have the highest proportion of the NEM’s wind 
power.  The MurrayLink-NSW\VIC grouping lacks the complex topology consideration of 
QNI-DirectLink.  Therefore, increasing the capacity of MurrayLink and NSW\VIC (Line 37) 
with suitable augmentation about Node 34 (Regional VIC) would solve this congestion.  
Currently, there is low capacity 132kV or 220 kV transmission networks connecting Node 34 
to its neighbouring nodes in SA, VIC and NSW. 
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We recommend two further research topics into congestion management to enable higher 
penetrations of wind power.  These are NEMLink discussed in Section 4.2 and unregulated 
interconnectors with energy storage discussed in Section 4.5. 
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